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and exchange rate dynamics, it is demonstrated that satisfaction of the formal
condition for existence of a unigue non—explosive solution of a linear rational
expectations model with forward and backward looking dynamic processes (equality
of the number of stable roots with the number of independent backward looking
processes) does not guarantee the economic sensibility of this solution, even
if one accepts the usual arguments for excluding "speculative babbles" from
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processes) does not assure that any of these solutions is economically sensible.
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Rational expectations models applied in monetary and macro economics
commonly include both forward looking dynamic orocesses in which current
variables are linked to their expected future values and backward looking
dynamic processes in which past values of these variables affect their current
behavior.1 These models generally admitan infinity of solutions consistent
with initial conditions on the predetermined variables. Studies of the char-
acteristics of these solutions have concluded that a unique non-explosive
solution exists when the number of stable roots of the dynamic system is equal
to the number of independent backward looking dynamic processes, and that an
infinity of non—explosive solutions exists when the number of stable roots is
greater than the number of independent backward looking processes.2 This
paper argues that even when there exists one or more non—explosive solutions
to such rational expectations models, there is no general presumption that
this solution is economically sensible.
This argument is related to, but is different from, the much discussed
controversy over the justification for eliminating self-generating speculative
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bubbles from the solutions of rational expectations models. Here, we will show
that even when the arguments for eliminating such bubbles are accepted as
economically justifiable, the formal conditions for existence of non—explosive
solutions in rational expectations models do not assure the economic sensibility
of such solutions. This will be established by considering variants of a2
generalized version of Dornbusch's (1976) model of exchange rate and price
dynamics. In this model, as described in section 2, there is a forward looking
dynamic process linking the equilibrium exchange rate and price level to expected
future economic conditions, and a backward looking dynamic process linking
adjustment of the actual price level to existing deviations from purchasing
power parity. The stability properties of solutions of this model are determined
by its characteristic roots, and X2, which are equal, respectively, to the
inverse of the absolute value of the interest semi—elasticty of money demand
=1/h)and to minus the speed of response of the price level to deviations
from purchasing power parity (X2 -b).
This identification of characteristic roots with specific parameters is
a virtue of this simple model because it enables clear perception of the economic
sensibility of various solutions of the model under alternative assumptions
about parameter values. When the parameters have economically sensible values
(h and b are both positive), as assumed in section 3, there is one stable and
one unstable root, and the unique non-explosive solution of the model is the
economically sensible solution (under the usual argument that excludes specula—
tive bubbles). When h and b are both negative, as assumed in section 4, the
model is economic nonsense, but it still has one stable and one unstable root
and, hence, a unique non—explosive solution. This solution, however, is not
economically sensible. When h is negative and b is positive, as assumed in
section 5, the model has two stable roots and an infinity of non-explosive
solutions. None of these solutions is economically sensible.
These examples establish a general proposition valid in complicated models
where the economic interpretation of characteristic roots may be murky. The
relationship between the number of stable roots and the number of backward
looking processes (or predetermined variables) is not enough to determine the
stability Properties of economically sensible solutions of the model.3
2. A Model of Price and Exchange Rate Dynamics
Following Dornbusch (1976) ,considera small open economy where the
condition of money market equilibrium is expressed by
m=k+p-h.i (1)
where m is the logarithm of the nominal money supply, k represents all exog—
enous factors affecting money demand, p is the logarithm of the domestic price
level, i is the domestic nominal interest rate, and h measures the semi—elas-
ticity of money demand with respect to i.The domestic nominal interest rate
is linked to the fixed world interest rate, i*, through the interest parity
condition,
i = + De(), (2)
where e is the logarithm of the exchange rate (defined as the domesticmoney
price of a unit of world money) ,andDe(e) is the expected rate of change of
the exchange rate which is assumed to equal the forward premium on foreign
exchange. In the continuous time model, with certainty, De(e) is the right
hand derivative of e with respect to time.In a discrete time model, with
uncertainty, De(e)E(e(t+l);t) —e(t)is the expected forward difference
of e, where E(x(s);t) denotes the expectation of x(s) conditional on informa-
tion available at time t. In either the continuous or the discrete time model,
the current exchange rate, e(t), is assumed to be a freely adjustable variable
that jumps immediately to the momemtary equilibrium value consistent with (1)
- e and (2), for given values of m, k, P 1* and D (e)
The domestic price level, in contrast, is assumed to be a slowly adjusting
variable whose current value is predetermined by past events. The equilibrium
value of p is determined by purchasing power parity to be e + p*, where p is
the logarithm of the world price level. Employing the simplifyingassumption4
that p' =0,the rule governing the adjustment of p is assumed to be given by
D(p)b(e —p)+De(e) (3)
where D( ) is the forward differential or difference operator. The first term
is this price adjustment rule, b.(e -p),describes the backward baling process
of adjustment of the sticky domestic price level to the existing state of dis-
equilibrium, as measured by the current deviation from purchasing power parity.
The second term in the price adjustment rule, De(e), prescribes a forward looking
adjustment of the price level to expected changes in its equilibrium value.4
Under the assumption of rational expectations, De(e) may be replaced by D(e)
in describing the dynamic system that characterizes the expected future paths
of the exchange rate and the price level. Solving equation (1) for i, and
substituting the result into (2), it follows that
D(e) =(1/h)[p —w] (4)
where w =rn-k+hi*summarizes the exogenous factors that will influence the
course of the exchange rate and the price level in future periods. Using (4)
to eliminate De(e) in (3), it follows that
D(p) =(1/h)•[p -w]+b•[e -pJ (5)
The dynamic system consisting of (4) and (5) determines the expected future
paths of e and p, starting from an initial time t =0,conditional on the
expected path of w(t) for t ￿.0and on the initial price level D(0).
This dynamic system contains a forward looking process arising from the
influence of the expected rate of change of the exchange rate on money demand
and on the rate of adjustment of the price level, and a backward looking process
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reflecting adjustment of the price level to deviations from purchasing power parity.
The stability properties of this system are determined by its characteristic roots:
=- b and =1/h. (6)5
The differential equation form of this system has a unique non-explosive Solution
if and A2 are opposite in sign, and a one—dimensional infinity of non-explosive
solutions if A] and A2 both have negative real parts. The difference equation
form of the system has a unique non-explosive solution if the modulus of one plus
one of the characteristic roots is >1and the modulus of one plus the other
characteristic root is <1,and a One—dimensional infinity of non—explosive solu-
tions if the modulus of one plus each of the characteristic roots is <1.
The next three sections will discuss the economic significance of alterna-
tive solutions of the dynamic system (4) and (5) under different assumptions
about the parameters b and h. Since the results are essentially the same for
the differential and difference equation forms of this system, attention will
focus on the differential equation form where the solutions can be more easily
expressed.
As a preliminary to this discussion, it is important to establish the
relationships between the characteristic roots A1 =- band A2 =1/hand the
dynamic processes governing the evolution of the deviation from purchasing power
parity, v =e-p,and the determination of the equilibrium path of the price
level and the exchange rate. Taking the difference between equation (4) and
equation (5), it follows that
D(v) =- b.v.
(7)
Appearance of the characteristic root A1 =- bin this dynamic equation indicates
the role of this root in controlling the process of adjustment of thedeviation
frompurchasing power parity. The solution of the differential equation formof (7)
v(t)=v(O).exp[—bti (8)
indicates why A1 =- b<0is necessary for stability of the process governing
adjustmentof the deviation from purchasing power parity; clearly, ifA1 was >6
v(t) would explode at a positive exponential rate whenever v(0)0. This
is a sensible stability condition because the process of adjustment of p in
response to deviations from purchasing power parity is a backward looking process
in which the coefficient b measures the speed of response of the price level to
the existing divergence from purchasing power parity.
The relationship between the characteristic root =1/hand the process
governing the behavior of the equilibrium price level and exchange rate is
established by considering the process that would govern the common value of
p and e if the price adjustment rule (3) were replaced by the assumption that
p is a freely flexible variable that adjusts immediately to maintain purchasing
power parity. Defining q as the common equilibrium value of p and e, equations
(1) and (2) reduce to a single differential or difference equation that is
essentially identical to the equation obtained when rational expectations are
imposed on Cagan's model of inflationary dynamics;6
m =k+q-h.[i*+D(q)J. (9)
Rewriting this equation in the form
D(q)=(l/h).[q—w] (10)
where w =m-k+h.i*,it is apparent that characteristic root A2 =1/his the
root that is involved in the dynamic process determining the behavior of the
equilibrium price level and exchange rate.
From an economic perspective, the dynamic process described by (9) or (10)
isforward looking since it arises from an economic relationship in which the
equilibrium price level depends on the forward looking expected inflation rate.
For such a forward looking process to have an economically sensible solution,
the associated characteristic root must be unstable; that
X2
=1/hmust
be positive. When this condition is satisfied, the solution for q(t) that is7
consistent with (9) or (10) can be written as
q(t) =F(t)+C.exp[(l/h)t] (11)
where C is an undetermined constant and F(t) is a weighted average of future




Whenever C0, the term C•exp[(1/h).t] contributes an explosive 'speculative
bubble" to the path of q(t). This bubble term appears in the general solution
of (9) or (10) because it is the solution to the homogenous form of these dif-
ferential equations (obtained by setting w =m-k+ h.i* equal to zero). Since
the initial price level is a freely adjustable variable in Cagan's model, it is
clear that the speculative bubble can be eliminated from the path of q(t)by
choosing q(0) to equal F(0), which amounts to setting C =0.Beyond this, it
is frequently argued that setting C =0is the economically appropriate choice
of C.One argument is that this assumption makes the price level depend only
on the economic fundamentals that ought to influence its behavior, rather than
having q(t) blast off to plus or minus infinity regardless of the behavior of
7
these fundamentals.
For present purposes, it is not essential that this or other arguments
for setting C =0be accepted as universally valid. It is essential, however,
that the nature of the economic assumption that is made in excluding speculative
bubbles from the solution of Cagan's model be clearly understood. It is also
essential that this be distinguished from the absence of any economic rationale
for assuming that v(0) =0in order to suppress explosive behavior of v(t) when
the backward looking adjustment process for deviations from purchasingpower
parity is unstable due to a negative value of the adjustment speed, b.S
3. The Economically Sensible Solution in the Normal Case
In the normal, economically sensible version of the model of price and
exchange rate dynamics, the speed of adjustment of the price level in response
to divergences from purchasing power parity is positive (b >0),andthe interest
semi-elasticity of rrcney demand is negative (h >0).Under these assumptions,
the characteristic roots A1 =- band A2 =1/hare real and opposite in sign,
implying that the differential equation form of the dynamic system (4) and (5)
has a unique non-explosive solution, and a one dimensional infinity of explosive
solutions, that are consistent with a given initial price level p(O). The same
conclusion applies for the difference equation form of (4) and (5) under the
additional economically reasonable assumption that the price level does not
over respond to the current divergence from purchasing power parity, as it would
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in a discrete time model if b were >1.
Focusing on the differential equation form (4) and (5), the general solution
for the paths of e(t) and p(t) can be written as
e(t) =A.exp[-b.t]+C.exp[(l/h).t]+F(t) (13)
p(t) =— hb.A.exp[—b.t]+C.exp[(l/h).t]+F(t) (14)
where F(t) is defined by (12) and where the constants A and C must be consistent
with the initial condition
—hb.A+C=p(O)-F(0). (15)
Byinspection,itisapparent that the first term in these solutions is associa-
ted with the characteristic root A1 =-band describes the evolution of the
divergence from purchasing power parity, and the second and third terms are
associated with the characteristic root A2 =1/hand describe evolution of the
common equilibrium value of the exchange rate and the price level.9
Given the initial price level p(O), there is one degree of freedom in
the solutions for e(t) and p(t), the degree of freedom associated with the
choice of the constants A and C consistent with the initial condition (15)
This degree of freedom allows for a free choice of the initial exchange rate,
e(O)A +C+F(O),for any given p(O) .Choiceof the initial exchange rate
determines the initial divergence from purchasing power parity, v(O) =e(O)
-p(O),but does not affect the stability of the process governing the subse-
quent evolution of this divergence. Specifically, taking the difference between
(13) and (14), it follows that v(t) follows the path of exponential decay
described by (8), with v(O) =(1+hb)A.
Choice of the initial exchange rate does critically affect the stability
of the path of the equilibrium price level and exchange rate, q(t) =Cexp[(l/h)'t]
÷ F(t). Specifically, to exclude the explosive term Cexp[(l/h)t] from the
equilibrium path of p and e it is necessary to set C =0,implying that A must
equal -(l/hb)fp(0)-F(OYIand that the initial exchange rate must be
e(0) F(0) —(1/hb){p(O)—e(0)]. (16)
The argument for choosing this initial exchange rate is the same as the argument
for choosing q(t) =F(t)as the solution for the equilibrium price level in the
rational expectations version of Cagan's model of inflationary dynamics--it is
economically sensible that the equilibrium price level should depend on an
exponentially weighted average of future w's, but not that it should explode to
plus or minus infinity regardless of the behavior of w. If one accepts this
argument, then the economically sensible solution for the paths of e(t) and p(t)
corresponds to the unique non-explosive solution of the dynamic system (4) and
9 (5) that is obtained by setting C =0and A =- (l/hb)[p(0) -F(0)1.10
4. A Nonsense Model with a Unique Non-Explosive Solution
When the speed of adjustment of the price level in response to deviations
from purchasing power parity is negative (b <0),the price adjustment rule is
not economically sensible and the dynamic process governing the evolution of
the divergence from purchasing power parity is not stable. When the interest
semi-elasticity of money demand is positive (h <0),there is no economically
sensible forward-looking expression for the equilibrium price level in the
rational expectations version of Cagan's nodel of inflationary dynamics.
Nevertheless, when the assumption that b is <0is combined with the assumption
that h is <0,the differential equation form of the dynamic system (4) and (5)
has a unique non-explosive solution. This conclusion also applies for the
difference equation form of this dynamic system under the additional assumption
that Il/hi <1.
Focusing again on the differential equation form of (4) and (5), the








and where the constants A and C must be consistent with the initial condition
—hb•A+C=p(0)-3(0)=Pc0). (20)
Taking the difference between (17) and (18), it is apparent that the first
terms in the solutions for e(t) and p(t) are still the terms that are associated11
with the dynamic process governing the evolution of the divergence from pur-
chasing power parity. Only now, with b <0,this process is explosively unstable.
The only way to eliminate the effect of this explosive instability on the paths
of e(t) and p(t) is by setting A =0and C p(O) .Thisis equivalent to
choosing the initial exchange rate so that there is no initial divergence from
purchasing power parity; that is, setting
e(0) =p(O). (21)
This choice of e(0) selects the unique non—explosive solution for e(t)
and p(t) out of the class of solutions defined by (17) through (20) ,justas
choice of e(0) in accord with (16) selects the unique non-explosive solution
for e(t) and p(t) out of the class of solutions defined by (12) through (15)
Theargument for imposing (16) when b and h are >0,however, does not justify
imposing (21) when b and h are <0.Imposition of (16) when b and h are >0
removes a speculative bubble from the solution path of the equilibrium
exchange rate and equilibrium price level on exactly the same basis as the
argument for excluding such a speculative bubble from the solution for the
price level in Cagan's model. Imposition of (21) when b and h are K0suppresses
an explosive, backward looking adjustment process by assuming that there is no
initial deviation from purchasing power parity. The economic specification of
the model of price and exchange rate dynamics provides no justification for
suppressing this genuine source of instability.
The difference between imposing (16) when b and h are positive and imposing
(22) when b and h are negative is illustrated in the phase diagrams shown in
figures 1 and 2 under the assumption that w is constant at some w.In both
diagrams, the vertical line along which p =wshows the combinations of p and e
for which D(e) =(1/h)[p -w=0;and the line along which e =p-(l/hb)[p -wi
shows the combinations of p and e for which D(p) =(l/h)[p -wi+b[e -p1 0.e
=0
e =- (1/hb)

















The difference between the two diagrams is in direction of adjustment of e
and p for points off of the D(e) =0line and the D(p) =0line. In figure 1,
where b and h are positive, D(e) is >0to the right of the D(e) =0line and
D(e) is <0to the left of this line, while D(p) is >0above the D(p) =0line
and D(p) is <0below this line. Exactly the reverse is true in figure 2 where
b and h are negative.
The stable branch in figure 1 is the line along which e =w-(l/hb)[p -w).
Given p(O), when e(O) is set in accord with (16), the initial point (p(0), e(O))
is on this stable branch; and subsequently the point (p(t), e(t)) moves toward
the point (w, w) at an exponential rate equal to -b.For any other choice of
e(O), the divergence from purchasing power parity decays at the exponential rate
-b,as indicated by convergence of the path of (p(t), e(t)) toward the line
along which e =p,but the common equilibrium component of p(t) and e(t), q(t)
=Cexp[(l/h)t]+w,explodes to plus or minus infinity because of a non—zero
value of c. Thus, imposition of (16) aircunts to choice of the stable branch in
figure 1 and is justified by the argument for excluding a speculative
bubble from the solution for the equilibrium price level and exchange rate.
In contrast, the stable branch in figure 2 is the line along which e =p.
Setting e(0) =p(0)places the initial point (p(0) ,e(0))on this stable branch.
Subsequently, the point (p(t), e(t)) converges to (w, w) at an exponential rate
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equal to 1/h.When e(0)p(0), the point (p(t), e(t)) converges toward the
line that is the stable branch in figure 1 and moves away from the point (w, w)
at an exponential rate equal to -b.This divergent behavior is not caused by
explosive behavior of the common element, C'exp[(l/h).t] +B(t),in the solutions
for p(t) and e(t), but rather by explosive behavior of the divergence frompur-
chasing power parity.Thus, choice of the stable branch in figure 2 is not
justified by the argument for excluding a speculative bubble from the solution
for the equilibrium price level and exchange rate.13
Lack of an adequate justification for choosing the unique non-explosive
solution from the class of solutions defined by (17) through (20) is not the
only serious problem with these solutions. There is also an important diffi-
culty with the economic interpretation of the term that represents the common
equilibrium value of e(t) and p(t) in these solutions; namely, the term
q(t) =Cexp{(1/h)t]
--B(t). (22)
It is easily verified that (22) provides the general backward looking solution
to the differential equation (9) or (10) that governs the behavior of theequi-
librium price level in the rational expectations version of Cagants model of
inflationary dynamics. When h is < 0, it is necessary to use this backward
looking solution, rather than the forward looking solution q(t) =Cexp[(1/h)t]
4- F(t), because the integral defining F(t) does not converge, for reasonable
assumptions about w, when h is < 0. The mathematical argument for using this
backward looking solution, however, does not provide an economic justification
for using this solution. In the backward looking solution given in (22) ,q(t)
depends on the past w's between 0 and t, not on future W'S between t and .
Thisdoes not make economic sense because the economic condition that determines
the equilibrium price level is one in which the current price level is linked
to the forward looking expected inflation rate. For this reason, the economically
appropriate solution for q(t) is the forward looking solution where q(t) depends
on the exponentially weighted average of future w's defined by F(t) .Froman
economic perspective, failure of the integral F(t) to converge when h is < 0
does not justify using the backward looking solution for q(t). Rather, it
indicates that there is no economically sensible expression for the equilibrium
price level and exchange rate when the interest semi—elasticity of money demand
is positive.14
5. A Case Where Every Solution Is Non-explosive
When the speed of adjustment of the price level in response to divergences
from purchasing power parity is positive (b >0),and the interest semi—elasticity
of money demand is positive (h <0),thecharacteristic roots =- band A2
=1/hare both negative. In this case, every solution of the differential
equation form of the dynamic system (4) and (5) is non-explosive. This conclu-
sion also applies to the difference equation form of this system provided
that 1/h <1.
When b is >0and h is <0,the solutions for the paths of e(t) and p(t)
are described by equations (17) through (20) of the preceding section. The
only difference is that with b >0,the first term in the solutions for e(t)
and p(t), which involves the factor A.exp[-b.tI, is no longer explosive for
non—zero values of A. Since the terms that describe the equilibrium price
level and exchange rate, Cexp[(l/h)t] +3(t),are also non-explosive, as they
were in the preceding section, it is apparent that for any initial price level
p(O) ,anychoice of the initial exchange rate e(0) implies a non-explosive
solution for e(t) and p(t). However, because h is <0,the backward looking
solution q(t) =C.exp[(l/h).t]+3(t),rather than the forward looking solution
q(t) =C.exp[(l/h).t}+F(t),must be used to represent the equilibrium price
level and exchange rate. Since this backward looking solution is not consis-
tent with the economic meaning of the forward looking dynamic process (9) or
(10) that determines the behavior of the equilibrium price level and exchange
rate, none of the solutions for e(t) and p(t) that are described by (17)
through (20) is economically sensible.
It is interesting to note that this difficulty with the economic interpre-
tation of the solutions for e(t) and p(t) seems to vanish when w is constant
at some w. In this special case, B(t) =w[l-exp((l/h)t)I.Hence, the15
solutions for e(t) and p(t) given by (17)and(18) can be written as
e(t) =A.exp[-b•tI+G.exp[(l/h).t]+w (23)
p(t) =- hb.A.exp[-b.tJ+G.exp[(1/h).t}+w (24)
where G =C-w,and where A and G must be consistent with the initial condition
-hb.A+G=p(O)-w. (25)
Thebehaviorof e(t) and p(t) when w is constant at w is illustrated in
the phase diagram shown in figure 3. The vertical line along whid-i e w shows
the combinations of p and e for which D(e) =(1/h).[p—w]=0.Since h is <0,
D(e) is <0to the right of this line, and D(e) is >0to the left of this line.
The line along which ep -(1/hb).[p-w]shows the combinations of p and e
for which D(p) =(1/h).[p—w]+b.[e —p]=0.Since b is >0,D(p) is >0
above this line, and D(p) is <0below this line. The initial position in the
phase diagram is determined by the predetermined initial price level p(0) and
the freely chosen initial exchange rate e(O). From this initial position, the
point (p(t), e(t)) moves in accord with the dynamic laws indicated by the arrows
in the phase diagram and converges to the equilibrium point (w, w) with at most
a half cycle rotation around this equilibrium.
The behavior of e(t) and p(t) described in this phase diagram (or by
equations (23) and (24)) appears to be economically sensible when w is regarded
as the equilibrium value of the price level and exchange rate. This apparent
sensibility, however, conceals a fundamental difficulty. When h <0,even with
w constant at w, the forward looking dynamic process that determines the behaviof
of the equilibrium price level and exchange rate has no convergent forward
looking solution. Hence, while w appears to be a sensible measure of the
equilibrium price level arid exchange rate, there is in fact no such measure.e









In this paper, a modified version of Dornbusch's model of price and exchange
rate dynamics has been used to establish two general principles concerning solu-
tions to rational expectations models that incorporate both forward and backward
looking dynamic processes. First, existence of a unique non—explosive solution
for such a model, which is implied by equality of the number of stable char-
acteristic roots with the number of backward looking dynamic processes does not
necessarily imply that this solution is economically sensible. Second, existence
of a multiplicity of non-explosive solutions for such a model, which is implied
by a greater number of stable roots than backward looking dynamic processes,
does not necessarily imply that any of these solutions is economically sensible.
The validity of these conclusions is clearly not limited to the relatively
simple model that has been used to demonstrate them. The virtue of this model
is that there is a clear economic interpretation for each of its characteristic
roots and for the dynamic processes with which they are associated. This makes
it possible to ascertain, with comparative ease, whether a specific solution for
the model is economically sensible. For more complicated models, this task is
likely to be both more difficult and more important. In a complicated model
with a number of interacting dynamic processes, the economicmeaning of specific
characteristic roots tends to become obscure, making it difficult to determine
whether a particular solution of the model is economically sensible. It is
precisely in this situation that comparison of the number of unstable character-
istic roots with the number of forward looking dynamicprocesses is not likely
to provide a reliable guide to the economic sensibility of alternative solutions
of the model.17
Footnotes
1. This structure is characteristic of models in which prices of goods
or assets depend on expected inflation rates or expected rates of capital gain
and in which asset stocks or contract wage rates depend on past economic
decisions; see, for example, Lucas (1975), Dorribusch (1976) ,Wilson(1979)
Taylor (1980) ,Buiterand Miller (1981) ,Blinderand Fischer (1981) ,Mussa
(1981 and 1982), and Basevi and Calzonari (1984)
2. The formal conditions for the existence of non-explosive solutions
to linear rational expectations models with forward and backward looking
processes are examined in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Buiter (1982a) .Also
see Calvo (1978 and 1979) ,Blanchard(1979) ,Burmeister(1980) ,Buiter(l982b)
Lipton, et. al. (1980) ,Dixit(1980) ,andTaylor (1977)
3. An insightful discussion of this controversy and references to the
relevant literature are given in McCallum (1983)
4. The price adjustment rule (3) is somewhat different from the rule used
by Dornbusch (1976), but it does incorporate in the term b (e -p)the same
essential mechanism of correction for existing disequilibrium as appears in
Dornbusch's price adjustment rule. The additional term De(e) in the price
adjustment rule (3) can be justified economically on the grounds discussed by
Mussa (1981 and 1982). Inclusion of this term also allows for very convenient
expressions of the characteristic roots of the dynamic system implied by the
model of price and exchange rate dynamics in terms of the parameters b and h.
5. It is preferable to speak of the distinction between forward looking
and backward looking dynamic processes, rather than forward looking and backward
looking variables, or freely flexible and predetermined variables. In the pre-
sent model, the price level is predetermined, hut its dynamic behavior is18
influenced by both forward and backward looking dynamic processes. The exchange
rate is a freely flexible variable, but at least in the economically sensible
solution of the model of section 3, the initial exchange rate depends on the
predetermined price level. Moreover, the model of price and exchange rate
dynamics (or any other linear dynamic model) can always be written in terms of
independent linear combinations of the original variables. This rewriting
can usually be done so that no variable is wholly controlled by either a for'iard
or a backward looking dynamic process, and so that no variable is either wholly
predetermined or completely flexible. Such a rewriting, however, does not alter
the mathematical or economic properties of the model.
6. For analysis of Cagans model under rational expectations, see especially
Sargent and Wallace (l973a and 1973b) .Alsosee Mussa (1975 and 1978)
7. In some cases, it is possible to eliminate the explosive bubble on the
grounds that it is inconsistent with maximizing behavior of individual economic
agents, but this is not possible in all such cases even when the theoretical
model deals explicitly with individual maximizing behavior; see Brock (1974 and
1975), Erock and Scheinkman (1980), Calvo (1979) and Scheinkman (1980) .Inthe
case of the German hyperinflation, the empirical evidence examined by Flood and
Garber (1980) appears to justify exclusion of an explosive bubble from the solution
for the path of the price level.
8.In a discrete time model, if we allow the length of the period to become
shorter and shorter, the constraint that b must be <1can be made consistent with
an arbitrarily speed of adjustment of the price level, in real time, in response
to deviations from purchasing power parity. Thus, there is no important difference19
between the constraint that needs to be imposed on this adjustment speed in the
discrete and continuous time versions of the model of price and exchange rate
dynamics.
9. This is essentially the same as the solution that Dornbusch uses in his
analysis. As Dornbusch explains, when the price level is below its long run
equilibrium level, the interest rate must be below its long run equilibrium level
in order to maintain momentary equilibrium in the money market. To maintain
interest parity with this low interest rate, there must be the expectation of
a decrease in the exchange rate. For this expectation to be rational, the
current exchange rate must be above its long run equilibrium level by exactly
the right amount, given the speed of convergence of the exchange rate toward its
long run equilibrium level.
10. No sensible economic explanation can be given for why the speed of
convergence of the price level and the exchange rate toward the common value w
should depend on the inverse of the interest semi-elasticity of money demand,
or, even more peculiar, why this speed of convergence should be independent of
the coefficient b in the price adjustment rule.20
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